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Irregular Warfare

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Purpose: ALSA Center publishes the *ALSB* three times a year. ALSA is a multi-Service DOD field agency sponsored by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center). This periodical is governed by Army Regulation 25-30, Chapter 10. The ALSB is a vehicle to "spread the word" on recent developments in warfighting concepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent is to provide a cross-Service flow of information among readers around the globe. **Disclaimer: Since the ALSB is an open forum, the articles, letters, and opinions expressed or implied herein should not be construed to be the official position of TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, Lemay Center, or ALSA Center.**

Submissions: We solicit articles and reader's comments. Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name, title, complete unit address, telephone numbers, and e-mail address. Graphics can appear in an article, but you must also provide a **separate computer file for each graphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi)**. Send e-mail submissions to alsadirector@langley.af.mil. ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the *ALSB* style and format. **Next issue: May 2010. Submission DEADLINE: COB 1 March 2010.** Theme of this issue is **"Close Air Support."**

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IN HOUSE

FEATURE ARTICLES

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Cover photo — A US Soldier from 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, hands an Afghan girl a bottle of water during an air assault mission to search for specific militant targets and safe havens within Sabari and Terezai Districts of Khost province in eastern Afghanistan. (USA photo by Spc Matthew Freire)

Director's Comments

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center continues to rapidly develop multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter. We are committed to solving inter-operability problems for the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who live and fight at the tactical level of war; and the purpose of the Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) is to provide a forum for warfighters to discuss "what worked" and "what needs to get fixed." Currently, we have 9 active projects in various phases of development with 8 additional publications going into research for revision this year. Right now, look for the newly developed MTTP publications on *Airspace Control* and *Advising Foreign Forces*. You can download all of our pubs from the ALSA website or order them through your Service's publication distribution system, but please be patient as we work through manpower challenges associated with posting to our website. As we look to the next ALSB, the theme is "Close Air Support" with article submissions due 1 March 2010 for the May 2010 issue.

The theme of this ALSB is irregular warfare (IW), which is a central focus of our military operations today. Our first article builds upon the September 2009 ALSB theme of unmanned aircraft (UA) as Lt Col LeHew and Mr. Collins discuss roles of UAs in IW. They define categories of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and describe the unique range of options UASs provide to meet IW demands. While UASs have focused on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) roles, the authors highlight less obvious missions relevant to IW, such as building partner nation capacity and enabling partner nations to conduct their own ISR operations. UASs are vital to intelligence support and our next article highlights the benefits of "boots on the ground" by interacting with the local populace. MAJ Cheng discusses the Iraqi Advisory Task Force (IQATF). The IQATF is composed of multiple teams which include retired special forces personnel combined with Iraqi born American citizens. These human intelligence collection teams provide commanders with an ability to obtain the "word on the street." In IW understanding, the local populace is the key to knowing where to make an impact and how to win support. Understanding the local populace is an excellent precursor to our next article by MAJ Parker. His article provides first person accounts of firefights from ambushes in the Afghanistan Tangi Valley. He identifies valuable lessons learned from their engagements and illustrates enemy tactics used in IW. Our next article by Lt Col Pietrucha, USAFR, and Lt Col Torres-Laboy, USAF, provides a creative proposal to expand the USAF contribution in the IW arena. The OA-X, light attack aircraft, is an affordable and capable propeller driven aircraft that can significantly contribute to the IW mission while simultaneously addressing a number of problems facing today's USAF. The OA-X could support multiple mission areas and provide a mechanism to build partner nation capacity by offering an affordable air arm solution to the respective nation. The overarching focus on IW also requires an expanded role of our judge advocates. MAJ Orenstein addresses their contributions in the campaign planning and targeting processes. He describes how the judge advocate aides the commander with additional capabilities to shape the counterinsurgency plan. Ultimately we can only defeat insurgencies through enabling the legitimacy and influence of the host government. Therefore a key role of the government is to enable their populace to rebuild their own country. In our last article LTC McDermit provides some suggestions for how the Iraqi government could gain popular support via job creation initiatives.

The recent turnover allows the ALSA Center to welcome our newest JASC member, Maj Gen Maurice H. Forsyth, Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, replacing Maj Gen Stephen J. Miller. We also welcome USA MAJ Troy Ewing as our new action officer and recent graduate of joint PME II, Norfolk VA. Enjoy the ALSA Bulletin and please give us feedback!

DAVID B. HUME
Colonel, USAF
Director

Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Irregular Warfare

A MQ-1B Predator unmanned aircraft from the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron takes off from Balad Air Base, Iraq, 12 June 2008. (USAF photo by Senior Airman Julianne Showalter)

"A principal reason many of our partner nations cannot effectively deal with terrorism and guerilla insurgency is precisely because they only possess ground-based militaries and because they have little…to offer in the way of airpower to find, fix, and finish critical…targets."

—USAF Irregular Warfare Concept,
Air Force Special Operations White Paper, May 2007

By
Lt Col Peter "Pepe" LeHew, USAF
and Mr. Jim Collins

BACKGROUND

Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) provide a unique range of options to meet the demands of irregular warfare (IW). UASs have been primarily used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and the intelligence preparation of the IW battlespace. Increasingly, "intelligence is operations" and special operations forces (SOF) credit their operations/intelligence construct as the most effective tool in conducting a highly successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

The phenomenal growth of UAS operations is illustrated by the accelerating increase of flight hours. For example, it took 12 years for the MQ-1B Predator fleet to reach 250,000 total flying hours, but in the following year and 8 months, that number doubled. With the increasing demand for full motion video (FMV), total flight hours by February 2009 reached 600,000. Most of the Predator hours were flown either in initial qualification training or in the skies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, nearly 75 percent of the Army's Hunter UASs are deployed in support of overseas contingency operations, with the remaining 25 percent used for training. The percentages are very similar for the Shadow UAS deployed in US Central Command's (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. The employment of UASs to meet USCENTCOM's urgent

operational needs has raised challenges in meeting the global demand associated with other theater operations.

UAS CHARACTERISTICS

UASs are generally familiar to most people, yet few realize how many different categories exist or their range of capabilities. Table 1 lists these categories into groups.

The long endurance of UASs, especially those in Groups 4 or 5, is an advantage that can prove vital for IW. Unmanned aircraft (UA) endurance promotes mission flexibility with the ability to change and/or augment flight crews while the aircraft is airborne. This keeps the crews fresh throughout the mission, and flight crews can do a face-to-face turnover while continuing to meet mission needs. Some of the larger UASs employ Remote Split Operations (RSO). This means the UAs are controlled via data links from distant locations during the mission phases of their sorties, reducing the forward footprint. Furthermore, RSO crews can immediately shift from one area of operations to another without shifting aircraft. The bottom line results in fewer forward-deployed assets to support operations and the capability for more operations worldwide with a given manpower pool.

Though potentially costly due to the distribution network, FMV from a UAS can prove vital for decision makers who may be in multiple locations and streamed in near-real-time to commanders, intelligence personnel, and local authorities. A challenge with the current networking structure that must be addressed is getting an equivalent capability to host nation (HN) or partner nation personnel and their communication infrastructures.

A challenge with the current networking structure that must be addressed is getting an equivalent capability to host nation (HN) or partner nation personnel...

The characteristic relative to this article is the potential to have multiple nations access the UAS ground control station and sensor feeds. For UAS Groups 2 through 5, having the flight crew on the ground allows a HN to mitigate the risks of local population concerns because their officials can access the UAS ground control station. They can have visibility into a supported mission and a level of control of the UAS during sensitive portions of the mission, thus potentially reducing the concerns of the population and leadership regarding activities inside their borders.

Table 1. UAS Categories

UAS Category	Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight (lbs)	Normal Operating Altitude (ft)	Speed (KIAS)	Current / Future Representative UAS
Group 1	0-20	< 1200 AGL	100 kts	WASP III, FCS Class I, TACMAV, RQ-14 A/B, Buster, BATCAM, RQ-11B/C, FPASS, RQ-16A, Pointer, Aqua/Terra Puma
Group 2	21-55	< 3,500 AGL	< 250	Vehicle Craft UAS, ScanEagle, Silver Fox, Aerosonde
Group 3	< 1320	< 18,000 AGL		RQ-7B, RQ-15, STUAS, XPV-1, XPV-2
Group 4	> 1320		Any Airspeed	MQ-5B, MQ-8B, MQ-1 A/B/C, A-160
Group 5		> 18,000 AGL		MQ-9A, RQ-4, RQ-4N, Global Observer, N-UCAS

ROLES FOR UAS IN IW

Most UAS operations to date can be summed up as information collection (ISR) and lethal fires (close air support, air interdiction, etc.). The challenge is balancing the enormous demand for FMV with the requirements of IW operations worldwide. Other, less obvious missions relevant to IW are civil-military operations, logistics support, communications/data relay, maritime reconnaissance, and building partner-nation capability.

HNs, nongovernment organizations, and other noncombat forces may use information the military UASs provide for natural disasters and civil-military operations. UASs can quickly identify those areas of the local infrastructure needing attention. UASs in support of police functions will also help bring stability to regions through intelligence activities and provide real-time information to guide security efforts. These data may also prove central in evidence collection for the prosecution of insurgents by local authorities.

With a specialized sensor payload, UAs could also support IW in a maritime environment by identifying and tracking hostile elements, detecting mines, and providing early warning.

Resupply and rescue are two mission areas often not accomplished simply due to the threat to a manned aircraft. Resupply missions allow sustained conflict (or aid) and allow decisions focused on tactical timing versus logistical constraints. The same is true for rescue operations in that supplies could include weapons, food, water, and survival gear required by evading personnel. Research is currently being conducted regarding actual rescue and recovery missions to include extracting a casualty or precious cargo from areas denied to manned aviation assets.

IW forces must be able to communicate by both voice and data but frequently operate where line-of-sight communications are not possible and satellite access is limited. UA with communication/data relay payloads could provide nodes for not only voice, but also Blue Force Tracking, global positioning system (GPS) augmentation, and over-the-horizon broadband communication. UAs with this payload could supply the tools proven effective in larger operations for maintaining command and control. There has currently been little to no fielding of this capability primarily due to the demand for ISR.

With a specialized sensor payload, UAs could also support IW in a maritime environment by identifying and tracking hostile elements, detecting mines, and providing early warning. They can monitor and secure coastlines to preclude smuggling and trafficking. UAs could also aid in conducting anti-piracy missions as well as performing the other missions mentioned above.

In addition to the maritime environment, IW operations routinely occur in austere areas. Moreover, while partner nations may desire support, it may be politically unacceptable for them to openly acknowledge a US presence. In both of these situations, reliance on airfields for staging military operations presents a significant challenge. Various UA, those able to take off and land vertically or use assisted launch and capture features, can operate from remote isolated areas and eliminate the need for a runway or sea-based platform. These IW mission sets may require unique personnel training and equipment for the UAS to perform effectively. So in order to integrate UASs into these missions, there must be a dedicated organization with the assets and trained personnel to conduct them. Just as some manned aircraft have been specialized (e.g., converting a C-130

to an AC-130 by adding the necessary hardware and crew training), IW may require an array of specialized/modified UAS. The unique nature of these missions may suggest initially employing them under US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and then expand to all Services.

BUILDING PARTNER NATION CAPACITY

Aviation, specifically UASs, provides a variety of capabilities to assist a partner nation in conducting stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. These assets allow the partner nation to better serve the needs of its population by bolstering its legitimacy and stability and potentially reducing the opportunities for exploitation by insurgents.

Of all the roles for UASs in IW, perhaps the most promising is enabling partner nations to conduct their own ISR operations. This function usually falls under the foreign internal defense (FID) and building partner nation capacity missions, but there is currently no such capability for UASs employment. Given the contributions of UASs in providing actionable intelligence, and the generally lower cost of UASs compared to manned options, building a UAS capability in partner nations is both logical and essential. The use of UASs is rapidly spreading worldwide, and the US must engage its partners to ensure they receive capabilities that are compatible with US interests and interoperable with US supporting assets.

The sharing of aviation technologies and training occurs with countries having the capability to operate and sustain an aviation force. One problem with this sharing is that US aviation and defense industries have historically lacked low-cost, sustainable solutions to meet the aviation needs of developing countries. As a consequence, those countries often choose non-US aircraft. In simplest terms, a country's choices may be one $50 million, high-tech, US-built aircraft; ten $5 million, low-tech, foreign-built aircraft; or one hundred $500,000 UASs that could be US-developed with the appropriate level of technology to match the nation's needs and support infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DOD) would benefit from an organization designed to perform FID and combat aviation advisory missions for UASs. While this function exists for manned aircraft, there is currently no such function for UASs today. With a UAS FID capability, DOD could more rapidly build partner nation capacity to support IW.

Of all the roles for UASs in IW, perhaps the most promising is enabling partner nations to conduct their own ISR operations.

CONCLUSION

The Commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), has declared "IW must be a core competency of the US military." Clearly UASs have many capabilities that make them an ideal tool for the IW fight. Traditional UAS ISR missions can certainly support IW. ISR can be provided to non-traditional users such as disaster response and humanitarian aid groups to assist in their missions. Non-ISR missions can also be executed, including civil-military operations and anti-piracy maritime reconnaissance. The immediate challenge is shaping current and emerging UAS capabilities to meet the demands of the global security environment without losing important capabilities.

Tactical Intelligence Enablers: An Introduction to the Iraqi Advisory Task Force



An Iraqi woman explains the issues within her village to US Marines from I Marine Headquarters Group (I MHG) during their patrol through Theiban Village in Iraq 9 October 2008. I MHG was conducting the patrol to maintain security, gather intelligence, and distribute supplies throughout villages surrounding Camp Fallujah, Iraq. (USMC photo by Lance Cpl Lindsay L. Sayres)

By
MAJ Louie Cheng, USA

In May 2009, an Iraqi Army raid in southern Iraq's Basrah province uncovered a weapons cache. Among the find were six improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hidden in toy stuffed animals. This discovery raised immediate questions: Were insurgents now targeting civilians? Were the toys just being used to smuggle the IEDs? Did the Iraqi security forces (ISF) have any information?

The effects coordinator and division leadership immediately began to consider how to assess the validity of the report and synchronize the information operations (IO) response. Ideas, contingency plans, requests for information (RFIs), and even designs for psychological operations (PSYOP) leaflets all began to circulate. Finally, someone asked, "What do the Iraqis think?" No one could answer the question, but the head of the Iraqi Advisory Task Force (IQATF) sprang into action. Within 72 hours, the IQATF polled 20 local Iraqi individuals throughout the province and found that not a single person believed that any group would intentionally use a toy or stuffed animal to target children. It was commonly believed that extremist groups had and were using toys to conceal and transport explosives. This intelligence laid concerns to rest, saved a lot of wasted staff time and energy, and most importantly, avoided the embarrassment of a non-credible IO leaflet campaign.

WHAT IS THE IQATF?

The IQATF is a human intelligence (HUMINT) information collection asset that provides commanders the ability to have an ear to the "word on the street" and to improve their situational awareness. Started in 2003 and expanded as a robust theater-wide capability in 2006 (contractors), it is organically available down to the battalion level. The IQATF is composed of multiple multifunctional teams (MFTs) that consist of a military advisor (MA) and an Iraqi advisor (IA). The MA is generally a retired special forces operator (18-series) with experience in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and a Top Secret or Secret security clearance. The IA is an Iraqi-born, American citizen who relocated to the US after the first Iraq War and has a security clearance. In addition to linguistic and cultural fluency, the IA is often originally from the location that they are assigned to. The IA usually has a college degree and typically extensive military, government, or business experience. The MFTs, in return, recruit and manage a network of local nationals who provide additional reach throughout the sector.

WHAT CAN THE IQATF DO FOR ME?

In the continuously changing battlefield of Iraqi sentiment, the IQATF is best utilized to get a quick feel of the "top of mind" issues in a particular area or a particular sentiment or response to a recent event or action. In Multinational Division–South, Iraq (MND–S, Iraq), for instance, brigade S7s use "word on the street" reports to compile an atmospheric assessment for their area at a weekly IO briefing. In recent weeks, the residents in An-Najaf province have been talking about corruption in the Iraqi government; the increase in drug trafficking and prostitution; computer literacy training offered by an anti-coalition force community group; and an increase in crime that the ISF has not been able to control. Knowing this information has enabled the local brigade to alter their IO speaking points and also to examine further with their law enforcement trainers to identify what has led to a perception of ISF shortcomings.

WHAT SERVICES CAN IQATF PROVIDE THE EFFECTS COORDINATION CELL?

- They can assist in development of products that are understandable, achievable, and resonate with locals.
- They review planning, projects, and materials to make sure the products produced (i.e., by tactical PSYOP teams) will have the intended effect.
- They help evaluate results by employing the network to determine if the effect was achieved.
- They identify shortfalls and recommend changes.
- They identify second-and third-order consequences based on atmospherics observed.

The IA is an Iraqi-born, American citizen who relocated to the US after the first Iraq War...

WHAT DOES THE IQATF NOT DO?

- They do not vet sources or conduct HUMINT for targeting purposes. This is open-source, and the strength is pulling from a broad base of respondents to establish a general pattern.
- They do not gather information from specific targets. Networks are not focused on specific people.
- They do not do close target reconnaissance.
- They do not translate documents. There are contractors or bicultural, bilingual advisors more suited for this.
- They do not do analysis. This is better directed to the human terrain analysis teams (HTATs).

HOW DOES THE IQATF DIFFER FROM THE HTAT?

The HTAT is a team of social scientists who focus on providing socio-cultural understanding through conducting secondary and primary research and interviews. The HTAT's primary methodology is to accompany unit movements in sector and do direct observation, surveys, and discussion. Since the team is visibly associated with coalition forces, this may limit the impartiality of responses to sensitive questions. While the IQATF network is entirely Iraqi and information is gathered in teahouses, in the market, and in mosques, the HTAT works through interpreters and is more appropriately used to gather information on non-sensitive questions.

Typical questions well-suited to the HTAT might include:

- What are open-source media trends about thoughts on the fairness of the recent elections?
- What are the historical lines of political affiliations among the tribes in our area of operation?
- How do women fit into the economic fabric of this town? What is their receptiveness to several potential projects?

In irregular warfare, understanding the local populace is the key to knowing where to make an impact and how to win their support.

HOW CAN I PUT THE IQATF TO WORK FOR ME?

- Although an IQATF team is doctrinally a battalion asset, the team(s) are sometimes consolidated at the brigade level. If this is the case, a staff officer at battalion (S2 or S7) should be identified as the coordinator. Therefore, company and platoon leaders should know to direct RFIs to him or her.
- It is most effective for the IQATF point of contact to then link the requestor up directly with the IQATF MA so that the intent can be clearly communicated.
- One company commander indicated a best practice. He would test IQATF sources by asking questions to which he already knew the answers. The commander then gave feedback to the MA on which IQATF sources the commander felt were trustworthy. The MA often used this feedback when deciding to retain certain individuals as sources.

HOW DO I INTEGRATE THE IQATF WITH THE REST OF MY STAFF?

The IQATF is valuable anytime it is helpful to know the human terrain and intelligence. This occurs most often in IO planning, civil military operations, operations coordination, and consequence management. Because of their roles, many units choose to task-organize IQATF operations under the G5 (Plans), G7 (Information Operations), or G9 (Civil-Military Operations). An important distinction is that IQATF's role generally begins once key questions have been defined.

CONCLUSION

In irregular warfare, understanding the local populace is the key to knowing where to make an impact and how to win their support. No matter how many times a commander or his staff has deployed in a theater, he will never possess the same insight as a local. The IQATF now provides the commander the ability to gain rapid, real-time atmospherics on the pulse of his human terrain. By combining this perspective with other intelligence sources, a leader, whether a section sergeant or commanding general, can save time, effort, and maximize the impact of limited resources.

Firefight Vignettes from Afghanistan

A USMC mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle with 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, is driven past old wreckage from a convoy attacked by the Taliban in Nawa district, Helmand province, Afghanistan, 9 September 2009. The Marines are deployed with Regimental Combat Team 3, whose mission is to conduct counterinsurgency operations in partnership with Afghan security forces in southern Afghanistan. (USMC photo by Lance Corporal James Purschwitz)

By
MAJ Kit Parker, USA

OVERVIEW

The Afghanistan Tangi Valley is a region in Wardak and Logar Provinces south of Kabul where *mujahideen* notoriously defeated a Soviet Army division during the 1980s. The region is not known for poppy cultivation but has revenue streams from orchards and fields of winter wheat and summer fruits and vegetables; livestock; and illicit copper and chromite mines. Currently, the region is bracketed by roads that are plagued by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct fire attacks (small arms and RPG rockets) against allied forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police.

The following vignettes are first person accounts of firefights from ambushes in the areas that illustrate enemy tactics used in irregular warfare to attempt to exhaust US forces, the range of responses available to allied forces, and the limitations on those responses.

DIRECT SUPPORT ROUTE CLEARANCE MISSION

Our unit was returning eastbound in the direction of Baraki Barak. The reception from villagers as we cleared at 10-15 kilometers per hour (kph) was chilly; no one responded to waves; no one smiled. In the mid-afternoon, groups of men gathered on doorsteps along the route to watch us. After reaching the turnaround point, we returned through the same village. This time, we noticed one or two men smiling at us as we drove through the village. We linked up with an allied unit accompanied by a small number of ANA personnel at the outskirts of the village. The units were linearly

arrayed along the route and were going to conduct a search of a house. We provided some dismounts to watch for people trying to escape from the back of the house; and after the unit finished the ANA-led search, we continued to move on.

At approximately 1800 hours, with the sun beginning to set at our 5 o'clock position relative to the direction of travel, we entered an S curve. There was a small ridge on our left and a drop down to a creek on our right. I was in the third Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in the convoy, and as our vehicle entered the convex part of the curve, an RPG rocket fired from the 3 o'clock position in the valley and exploded at the surface of the road less than 10 meters to our front. The vehicle commander (TC) yelled a warning as he saw an RPG rocket fire from our right, giving us just enough time to brace. I was on the bench seat staring out the window directly at the 3 o'clock position, and the RPG rocket was followed shortly by AK 47 fire. The yellowish muzzle flash of the AK 47 was visible in the setting sun at a position in the valley approximately 300 meters to our right. The enemy had chosen a good position. In addition to the creek at the bottom of the 5-meter drop to our right, there was a clear valley floor and another wider creek, placing them just on the other side with a village to their rear.

As we sought to direct the fire of the turret gunners, dismounts from our vehicle found themselves in two very different predicaments.

I observed the shooter at the 3 o'clock position on the other side of the creek in the valley floor. The TC squeezed back to take a look. He confirmed this as the direction of the RPG rocket, and we returned fire through the firing ports while the TC squeezed through the roof turret with an M203.

As we began to return fire, another RPG rocket impacted and exploded just to the rear of our vehicle, which because of the curve in the road was the closest to their firing position and offered a broadside view of the MRAP vehicle. Suddenly, the insurgents opened fire from several positions atop the creek bank. Our crew-served weapons opened up, and our vehicle TC tried to redirect another vehicle's .50 caliber machine gun onto the RPG rocket-firing site. With the sun setting rapidly behind the mountains on the other side of the valley, the ambient light conditions were too bright for night vision devices and the signature blue smoke cloud of an RPG rocket launch was difficult to detect with the naked eye. Targeting was also impaired due to signature glow of armor piercing incendiary rounds from the .50 caliber machine gun burn bright on impact and can appear as a muzzle flash to the untrained eye. We were dependent on first sightings and good communication to direct gunners.

As we sought to direct the fire of the turret gunners, dismounts from our vehicle found themselves in two very different predicaments. Dismounts from the rear of the convoy were trying to flank the enemy from our 6 o'clock position. Dismounts from the front of the convoy had moved down the embankment to the closest creek bed only to find themselves pinned flat on the ground behind a pancake-shaped boulder as AK 47 fire pummeled the bank a meter behind them and in the dirt around them. As we returned fire from the vehicle, we noticed the muzzle flashes from the enemy at the 3 and 4 o'clock positions moving away from us towards a village that would align our return fires with the flanking friendly dismounts. We lifted fires as the fleeing enemy ran headlong into our dismounts and squirted into the village beside them. When the pinned dismounts crossed the first and second creeks and climbed atop the creek bed on the other side of the valley, they linked up with the flanking dismounts and searched the village to no avail. We closed the troops in contact after 2 hours and continued back to our forward

operating base (FOB) without further incident. Upon return to the FOB, human intelligence (HUMINT) sources reported two of the enemies killed in action and enemy fighters dragging their wounded from the valley.

LESSONS LEARNED

- The enemy effectively uses the terrain to his advantage.
  - ••Hitting us in the curve meant that we did not have visibility on all vehicles; so we never saw the RPG rocket impact in the convoy rear.
  - ••Firing from the other side of the valley floor offered two obstacles (the creeks) for our dismounts to traverse, a clear field of fire to repel our frontal assault, and a village for the enemy to use as an egress route and as cover and concealment by mixing in with the population.
  - ••Taking advantage of the setting sun behind the mountains to their rear prevented our use of night vision devices, but the ambient light conditions were poor. With the setting sun at their backs, they had the advantage in visually identifying their targets.
- We did not make effective use of indirect fires. When the shooters were in the valley floor by the creek, they became a suitable artillery target. Furthermore, illumination rounds from the M777s that were within range would have eliminated the visual advantage the ambient light conditions offered the enemy.
- The dismounted flanking maneuver by elements to the convoy rear of the convoy surprised the enemy as they tried to escape.
- The long duration of the dismounted operations (more than 2 hours) increased the risk of the enemy having time to emplace an IED on our previously-cleared return route.
- The dismounted movement across the valley floor (approaching one kilometer) and into the villages eliminated the possibility of supporting fires from the crew-served weapons on the vehicles.
- The boldness of the dismounted maneuver was probably unexpected and had some benefits in eliminating the enemy, relieving fire on the pinned dismounts and vehicles, or in the emplacement of IEDs further down the route. However, the enemy could exploit repeated use of this technique to pull the dismounts into a fire-sack ambush.

GENERAL SUPPORT ROUTE CLEARANCE MISSION (3 weeks later)

Our unit was clearing westbound toward Wardak Province and Highway 1. It was approximately mid-day, and our convoy was traveling 10 kph as we scanned for IEDs. The villages along the route in the valley were uncharacteristically deserted, and the reception from villagers was restrained. No one responded to waves, and there were no smiles. The TC of the lead vehicle commented over the radio, "I have a bad feeling about this." This was shared by the Buffalo TC and myself.

With the setting sun at their backs, they had the advantage in visually identifying their targets.

Shortly thereafter, as the convoy entered an S curve, an RPG rocket was launched from the valley floor, again on the other side of a creek but in a recently plowed field on the far side of the valley. The RPG rocket's trajectory took it behind the Buffalo, which was the fourth vehicle in the convoy behind an MRAP vehicle with a mine roller and two Husky mine-detecting vehicles. The Buffalo TC immediately called an "All Stop" over the radio and called a direction and distance to the signature blue smoke cloud that marked the origin of the fire. In the daylight conditions, the smoke cloud was clearly visible against the light dirt of the creek bank behind it (about 300 meters away at our vehicle's 9 o'clock position). The TC and I went through the roof hatches of the Buffalo to return fire as the enemy directed small arms fire toward our element from fighting positions to the right of the RPG rocket's origin. As we returned fire, the crew-served .50 caliber machine guns and MK-19

grenade launchers directed fire toward the enemy positions. During the fray, fixed-wing close air support (CAS), in the form of F-15s, called the combat observation and lasing team and said they could not engage because they saw our rounds impacting in multiple locations. A second RPG rocket launched from a position approaching our vehicle's 10 o'clock position crossed over the hood of our Buffalo while the TC and I returned fire. As our gunners consolidated fire of the crew-served weapons on an orchard that bordered the field where the shooters had originated, enemy firing ceased, and the F-15s radioed that there were no longer enemy fighters in the area. We ceased fire after the 5-10 minute engagement and continued to clear westbound. As we continued on our way, the Buffalo TC commented that the engagement was not all the enemy had planned for the day. It was an ominous comment, considering we were about to be ambushed just a few hours later at sunset.

Because of the scattered fires and the proximity of the village, fixed-wing CAS could not engage targets and was essentially useless.

LESSONS LEARNED

- The enemy effectively uses the terrain to his advantage.

  ••Hitting us in the curve again meant that we did not have visibility on all vehicles.

  ••Firing from the other side of the valley floor with a village to their immediate rear would, under normal conditions, restrict the fires of our crew-served weapons and limit the use of fixed-wing CAS. It also afforded the enemy an egress route, as they slipped into the village and disappeared among the populace.

- Part of this disorientation of fires might have been because the clockwise direction called over the radio was relative to the Buffalo vehicle that was, again, in the convex portion of the S curve relative to the enemy's position.

- Because of the scattered fires and the proximity of the village, fixed-wing CAS could not engage targets and was essentially useless. It should be noted that the direct support route clearance patrol had previously reported that the visible presence of rotary-wing aircraft was a deterrent to enemy attacks, but visible fixed-wing aircraft did not.

- Other direct fire engagements on this road were all at sunset, approximately 1800 hours. Even though this was the first time this RCP had operated in this area of operations, the Buffalo TC's omen that this event was a precursor to things to come would prove accurate. Other than the gut instinct of a seasoned combat veteran, other indicators included the brief engagement, limited small arms fire, and only two RPGs rockets, and the mid-day timing under excellent weather conditions. All suggested that this engagement fulfilled the enemy's intent to gauge our response, slow us in preparation for a subsequent engagement, and/or signal other insurgent elements further west in the direction of travel of our approach.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of these firefights highlights enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in irregular warfare including the use of terrain and how they target certain units. Detailed analyses of firefights, especially those that reoccur in the same geographical area and are perpetrated by the same small group of insurgents, reveal emergent trends in enemy TTP. Too often, units conduct after-action reviews quickly after a mission and do not compile and analyze detailed accounts of firefights. Training Soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers to write accounts of interaction with the population and engagements with the enemy is an effective way to make them think analytically, better read the populace, and develop new, creative ways to defeat the enemy in future engagements.

Making the Case for the OA-X Light Attack Aircraft

Colombian A.29 Super Tucano on static display at Apiay AB, Colombia. The A.29 is an example of the kind of aircraft envisioned as an OA-X. (Photo by Lt Col Michael Pietrucha, USAFR)

"For those missions that still require manned missions, we need to think hard about whether we have the right platforms—whether, for example, low-cost, low-tech alternatives exist to do basic reconnaissance and close air support in an environment where we have total control of the skies—aircraft that our partners also can afford."

— Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Maxwell AFB, 21 April 2008

By
Lt Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAFR
and
Lt Col David J. Torres-Laboy, USAF

INTRODUCTION

Air Combat Command (ACC) is considering a light attack aircraft designed for employment by both the USAF and partner nations (PNs). This aircraft, called OA-X, will be a precise, rugged, and affordable aircraft intended for current fights and for future operations in the medium to low intensity spectrum of conflict. There is a case to be made for a light attack aircraft, to fulfill the following requirements: to provide an expanded deployment envelope with a smaller logistical footprint compared to the legacy fighter force, to gain significant cost savings in terms of fuel and operations costs, and to possess an attack aircraft useable by PN air forces. The acquisition of a fleet of OA-X aircraft is not out of our reach and may address a partial solution to a number of problems facing today's USAF.

Possessing a legacy focused on major combat operations, the USAF is faced with a directive to "rebalance" the force. Obviously, we

still cannot afford to focus exclusively on irregular warfare (IW). Accordingly, the OA-X is not a replacement for a credible 4th and 5th-generation fighter capability, but rather a complementary capability designed for a different operational environment. The challenge, as we see it, is threefold:

• Provide a menu of tailorable capabilities resident in the conventional forces, to include aircraft and trained personnel, focused on IW.

• Field a capability to train, equip, and employ US forces for the full range of military operations, while simultaneously reducing the cost of doing so.

• Enhance national security by providing a robust capability to train, equip, advise, and assist PN air forces for the challenges they may face, thereby acting as a preventive measure while strengthening our partners for the inevitable cases where prevention fails.

The OA-X is not a "low-tech" solution but a "right-tech" solution, designed to provide capabilities to the USAF while still providing a multirole aircraft that can be employed by a wide range of partners.

DEFINING THE LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY

The ACC OA-X Enabling Concept (Dec 08) is the current conceptual document for the OA-X. The concept calls for an aircraft that is capable of performing light attack, training, and armed reconnaissance missions. The aircraft will provide the greatest benefit as a transferable, affordable, modular, and interoperable (TAMI) asset. The US-flown version of the aircraft must have the following attributes:

- Austere–field capable; easy to maintain and operate; low logistical (fuel) demand.
- Capable of delivering and guiding precision-guided munitions (PGMs) up to 500 pounds, aerial gunnery, and rockets.
- Five-hour sortie endurance without refueling; 900+ nm ferry range.
- Two-seat, night vision goggle (NVG)-compatible; full duplication of flight controls; missionized cockpit.
- Armor; flares; self-protection equipment; self-sealing fuel tanks; and ejection seats.
- Electro-optical (EO)/infrared (IR) sensor capability similar to current advanced targeting pod; capability to laser designate and illuminate.
- Secure voice/data communications; line of sight (LOS) and beyond LOS; single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), including full motion video (FMV) capability.

OPERATIONS

The OA-X is not a "low-tech" solution but a "right-tech" solution, designed to provide capabilities to the USAF while still providing a multirole aircraft that can be employed by a wide range of partners. In the context of a high/low mix, the "low" end will consist of multirole aircraft which are no less useful or flexible than their "high-end" counterparts, but which are designed to excel, affordably, in a different portion of the spectrum of conflict.

By comparison to legacy fighters, the OA-X will fly slower but have more endurance on internal fuel. While not air-refuelable, the ability to land on forward fields or roads for refuel and rearm gives OA-X persistence without tanker support. On an aircraft-to-aircraft basis, the OA-X has more endurance, similar air-to-ground ordnance load, and a much reduced operating cost (with no tankers required) compared to an F-16, with a response time similar to an A-10 and more basing or landing options than either aircraft. With an EO/IR sensor, we gain an armed reconnaissance capability that is superior to the MQ-1 Predator, with less endurance but more weapons payload, a more permissive operating envelope, and the greater flexibility that comes with flying a manned aircraft.

Using current operations as examples, obvious mission areas include close air support, forward air

controller (airborne), armed reconnaissance / strike coordination and reconnaissance, escort, combat search and rescue, border patrol / countersmuggling, and counternarcotics. Given different challenges, similar to those found in Colombia or the Philippines, interdiction, maritime operations, and air intercept missions are possible. For integration efforts with PNs, a PN crewmember, student, or "rider" can also be carried in place of a USAF crewmember.

Given the high terrain, deep canyons and extreme temperatures common to Afghanistan, OA-X will be able to provide air support in conditions where helicopters or small unmanned aircraft cannot operate. But Afghanistan and Iraq will not be the only locations where these aircraft are employed. Legacy fighters are largely constrained by the need to operate from long, high-strength runways. The OA-X, capable of flying from austere strips, exponentially expands the number of bases available to attack aircraft. The lower logistical footprint of the OA-X is a significant operational benefit, allowing operations under conditions that would ground legacy fighters due to lack of support. A PT-6 driven turboprop aircraft, with bombs on board, has a loiter fuel flow at 15,000 feet of about 330 pounds per hour. An F-15E will consume this much fuel in less than 8 minutes at the throttle setting required for taxi.

SECOND-ORDER EFFECTS

The combat capabilities of the OA-X tell only part of the story. For the USAF, the "second-order" effects may end up being as significant as the combat capabilities of the airframe. OA-X will provide a variety of benefits, including Air National Guard (ANG) personnel, facilities, and expertise; an increase in the number of cockpits to help our rated manning requirements; and low operating and support costs. The expanding requirements to train and maintain currency for our joint terminal attack controller can be filled by the OA-X. OA-X aircraft could perform a number of homeland defense missions, and ANG squadrons could provide a crucial strategic reserve for the United States by increasing the number of available and experienced attack pilots and preventing the loss of attack expertise as a result of base realignment and closure (BRAC)-directed realignment.

BULDING PARTNERSHIPS

However capable we are, the long war will not be won by the USAF or even by the United States using all of its instruments of national power. Victory will come by, with, and through our partners. The "hundred-wing" Air Force refers to a common effort where PNs have the capability to conduct effective air operations in their own countries. The USAF will provide support, but in cases where there is an effective air capability owned by a partner, we will not have to provide one ourselves. In effect, the ability to assist PNs with the creation, maintenance, and operation of a credible air arm becomes part of the national "exit strategy" for the long war—an ongoing process that allows us to switch from one hot spot to the next, rather than pursuing a USAF-only strategy that builds permanent aviation dependence by PNs.

Many of our PNs around the world do not have the capability to fly and maintain high-tech aircraft.

In the 1970s, the USAF provided a large number of Air Forces worldwide with Vietnam-surplus aircraft for precisely the purpose of helping to provide an effective bulwark against a common Communist-inspired threat. The hurdles associated with repeating our successes from the 1970s are significant. Many of our PNs around the world do not have the capability to fly and maintain high-tech aircraft. What they require is a cost-effective capability to help them against criminal gangs, insurgents,

terrorists, or even narco-traffickers. The ability to find, fix, and finish the enemy from the air is an asymmetric advantage.

The OA-X is intended to be suitable for PN air forces needing an attack or training capability and also suitable for USAF combat employment. It is reasonable for a PN to look for shared opportunities to train, procure, and maintain with the largest Air Force on the planet, but this will only work if the USAF employs similar capabilities. In many cases the perception exists that if it is not good enough for the USAF, it is not good enough for a small air force. We cannot reasonably train PN air forces to be competent at things we do not do.

A new plan is needed to find a cheaper alternative to the current missions and provide a much needed platform to enable partner nations' air forces in the IW arena.

THE BUSINESS CASE

Capability aside, the OA-X has a credible business case behind it. The effect provided by OA-X is similar to what the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is providing with the legacy fleet—only for much less in terms of fuel consumed, airframe life, and maintenance costs. For a comparison, we examined one Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF 1) consisting of a squadron of F-16s and half a squadron of F-15Es flying 36 four-hour air refueled sorties per day (24 for the F-16, 12 for the F-15E). For the OA-X, AETF 2 consisting of two 18-PAA squadrons of OA-X, also flying 36 four-hour sorties per day, but with no air refueling.

In a nutshell, AETF 1 has a daily fuel requirement of 636,000 pounds at the base, plus roughly 420,000 pounds of tanker-delivered fuel, requiring six tankers which burn 160,000 pounds themselves. The total: 1,216,000 pounds of fuel per day, or over 65 million gallons per year at a cost of $94 million per year. AETF 2 requires 60,000 pounds from the base per day or 3.2 million gallons per year with no tanker support at all, dropping the fuel cost to $4.6 million per annum—roughly 5% of AETF 1.

Obviously, fuel costs are only a portion of the operations cost of aircraft. Compared with an OA-X estimated cost of around $1,500/hour, the costs of the legacy fleet are high: F-15E—$18,050, F-16C—$9,019, KC-135R—$8,483. The savings associated with a mix of OA-X and legacy forces are substantial, offsetting the purchase price of the OA-X in a relatively short timeframe, in addition to reducing the flying hours flown by the legacy fleet. In a long war that is likely to continue far beyond the 5-year horizon, we gain not only a significant addition to both our capabilities and capacity, but we gain additional breathing space to fund the necessary modernization and recapitalization of our high-end capabilities.

CONCLUSION

"A good plan executed today is better than a perfect plan executed at some indefinite point in the future."

—General George S. Patton, Jr

Over the last 8+ years, the USAF's "good plan" relied heavily on using the available assets, currently in the inventory, over Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, given the requirements for building partnership capacity and the high costs of employing legacy fighter assets, we are not meeting the demand in an efficient, fiscally responsible, or transferable manner. A new plan is needed to find a cheaper alternative to the current missions and provide a much needed platform to enable partner nations' air forces in the IW arena. The earlier we can field a light attack aircraft, the sooner we can capitalize on the costs savings associated with partially replacing our current legacy squadrons in theater and the sooner we can re-establish long-dormant capabilities with our partners.

Using a Judge Advocate to Streamline the Targeting Process in Irregular Warfare Environments



US Army LTC James Zieba, a staff judge advocate with Task Force Cyclone, and Abdul Manan Atazada, the chief judge of the Kapisa province of Afghanistan, discuss building plans for a jail in the Tagab Valley district center area of the province 25 Aug 2009. The task force's mission is to assist the Afghan government with security, construction, economic, and agricultural support as well as to facilitate the reception, training, housing, and sustainment of US troops entering the country. (DOD photo by Spc William E. Henry, US Army)

By
MAJ Joseph N. Orenstein, USA

As irregular warfare has become the norm, judge advocates have become increasingly important advisors to commanders at all echelons. They have also become intensely involved in military planning. No longer is a judge advocate simply asked to give a thumbs-up to an engagement. Now, they are providing key input in how operations are conducted and, in many cases, are influencing what operations are conducted at all. Judge advocates can provide qualitative advice to inform the military decision making process and to help shape campaign plans in complex environments.

Historically, the primary role of judge advocates has centered on handling military justice, claims, and legal assistance issues. However, as the battlefields began to become more complex in the mid-20th century, the need for more intensive legal support grew. In Vietnam, for example, judge advocates began to assume more direct roles in the planning process, ensuring that operations were conducted in compliance with the Law of War, otherwise known as the Law of Armed Conflict. The issue was typically relegated to the question "is it legal, Judge?" However, the role of the judge advocate in military operations planning has continued to evolve. This change began in the late 1990s where attorneys were sought to provide more nuanced input into the military decision

making process. Most recently, changes under Army transformation have enhanced the involvement of judge advocates in the targeting process by assigning them directly to brigade combat teams.

Currently, complex unconventional operating environments require more intense pre-planning analysis that incorporates a wider range of disciplines. An increasing number of missions are arising which require the Army to conduct stability-type operations, where influencing populations is more essential than achieving victory by force over a conventional force. As commanders plan campaigns and develop forces to conduct these missions, a key area where they can be assisted by their judge advocate is in the targeting process.

Normally, a targeting legal review centers on ensuring that an operation meets the four basic principles of the Law of War: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering. By evaluating these factors, an attorney will generally be able to provide an opinion as to the legality of a mission. What the opinion will not do is tell the commander whether an operation is a good idea or whether there are other options available that might be better suited to win the battle AND the war. Judge advocates, however, can increase a commander's ability to have this information through enhanced pre-decision legal analysis of targeting packets.

As commanders plan campaigns and develop forces to conduct these missions, a key area where they can be assisted by their judge advocate is in the targeting process.

The Brigade Judge Advocate (BJA) for 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (2/10 MTN) from 2005-2007 instituted a review process designed to be nested with the brigade commander's intent for conducting and completing the mission. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 06-08, 2/10 MTN was tasked with conducting counterinsurgency operations in the area of Southwest Bagdad (an area including the population centers of Mahmudiyah, Yusifiyah, and Lutifiyah, as well as parts of Al-Rashid). The brigade commander wanted to conduct an effective counterinsurgency that won the trust and confidence of the local population while simultaneously empowering local security forces (primarily the 4th Battalion, 6th Iraqi Army Brigade) to assume responsibility for security in the sector. The operational environment was extremely complex. There were a multitude of so-called enemy forces, insurgents who blended in to the local population and sought to exploit the US adherence to the Laws of Armed Conflict by violently manipulating popular opinion.

Members of the brigade targeting and effects working group conducted legal reviews on all lethal and non-lethal target packages and developed plans for operations in sensitive locations (e.g., mosque entry packets). The review process allowed for access to the entire targeting packet including the intelligence meant to support the commander's decision to engage. The nominated packets were examined for compliance with the four Law of War principles. In order to determine whether these targets were nested with the commander's intent, a level of depth of analysis was added to the reviews. This added component used an effects-based approach to determine the next step following a successful operation.

For example, if a targeted individual was captured, what came next? Was there enough intelligence or independent evidence to justify continued detention in coalition force detention facilities, under the OIF mandate that allowed for holding individuals that posed a direct threat to stability or security in Iraq? Was there enough evidence of criminal misconduct to ensure an individual would be transferred to the theater internment facility (TIF) or could be successfully prosecuted under the Iraqi judicial system? If our units

killed or captured a person, would the local population judge the action to be a legitimate consequence of war or would they see US forces as an indiscriminate killer/occupier?

The commander was very interested in knowing the effects-based impact of conducting specific operations. This analysis provided an essential insight into the impact of operations on the key center of gravity for the brigade in its counterinsurgency campaign, the local population. It was essential that if a "bad guy" was taken off the streets, he could be taken out of the fight (i.e., held for an extended time either at the TIF or in an Iraqi detention facility). Failure to hold a targeted individual meant that he would be quickly released back into the local population thereby increasing the risk of harm to others and sending the wrong message to the local population. In another vein, if the brigade conducted a lethal engagement, absent sufficient evidence or due consideration of cultural impacts, there could be significant impact on the local populace's view of the unit and of the operation.

The brigade targeting process relied upon effective communication from the brigade commander as to his intent for the mission. In addition, it required a significant amount of training to inform commanders, staffs, and Soldiers on the essential components of the methodology. This training began prior to deployment during a mission readiness exercise at the National Training Center. Members of the brigade legal section, the provost marshal section, and the brigade exploitation officer (S-2X) trained Soldiers on evidence collection and preservation, taking and providing sworn statements, and tactical questioning/interrogation. Further information was disseminated to the brigade regarding the procedures for courts under the Iraqi judicial system (for example the system's heavy reliance on live witness testimony and photographs of crime scenes and evidence). This sought to ensure that the Soldiers had a contextual understanding of the impact of how they executed their missions during actual operations would have.

The impact of the predecision legal analysis of targeting packets is most clearly seen in the success of the brigade's detention operations program. From September 2006 through July 2007, 2/10 MTN transferred approximately 91 percent of its total detainees to the theater internment facility, and approximately 85 percent of the detainee packets were thereafter found to contain sufficient evidence to justify extended detention and potential trial in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Approximately 5 percent of brigade detainees were transferred to the Iraqi police for potential action, and only 4 percent were released outright back to the initial point-of-capture. This means that, in general, the BCT was detaining people who were either genuine security threats or for whom there was enough evidence to hold them over for trial through the Iraqi judicial system. A less tangible, but occasionally valuable, impact could be seen in the brigade commander's ability to counter arguments that US forces were heavy handed or taking unjustified actions against an innocent population.

The legal reviews also had a significant impact at lower echelons as battalion commanders recognized the value of having this kind of analysis integrated into their planning processes. Although not required, 2/10 MTN battalion S-2s began to present many of their targeting packets to the BJA for review. Army general purpose force battalions do not have an assigned judge advocate, so the ability to incorporate legal reviews into the battalion targeting process hinges significantly on the relationships

...if the brigade conducted a lethal engagement, absent sufficient evidence or due consideration of cultural impacts, there could be significant impact on the local populace's view of the unit and of the operation.

between battalion S-2s and the BJA. Integrating the legal analysis into the targeting process allowed for the subordinate maneuver battalions to ensure that their operations were conducted in the manner that they wanted and were better nested with the brigade commander's intent and campaign plan.

The expanded employment of judge advocates in the analysis and review of targeting plans prior to a commander's decision to execute proved to be an invaluable mechanism for the 2/10 MTN brigade during OIF 06-08. The prospective, effects-based approach demonstrated the value of judge advocates to commanders across the tactical level and provided the brigade commander with additional capabilities to shape his counter-insurgency campaign plan. The expanded legal review made each mission more effective and helped to ensure the safety of the local population and of the Soldiers sent to protect them.

The prospective, effects-based approach demonstrated the value of judge advocates to commanders across the tactical level and provided the brigade commander with additional capabilities to shape his counterinsurgency campaign plan.

Iraqi policemen listen as tribal sheiks speak with US Army Capt. Brett R. Swaim, battalion judge advocate, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 1, about the progress the Iraqi police force is making during a detainee release at Shebab police station in Ramadi, Iraq, 17 Sep 2008. (USMC photo by Sgt Jeremy M. Giacomino)

Addressing Unemployment and Gaining the Popular Support of the Iraqi People

US Army Staff Sergeant Hugo Rivera, with the 445th Civil Affairs Battalion (CABN), talks with the construction company manager of the Basra Talent School in Basra, Iraq, 23 June 2009. The battalion is checking on the project completion status of the school and collecting intelligence in and around the project site. (USAF photo by Staff Sergeant Chrissy Best)

By
LTC Matthew J. McDermit, USA

OVERVIEW

Unemployment and dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government remain high in Baghdad and across Iraq. Destitute Iraqis from high unemployment areas are recruited by insurgents and paid to toss RKG-3 hand grenades or fire RPG rocket launchers at coalition forces. Addressing unemployment in Baghdad and across Iraq would do much to garner the popular support of the Iraqi people and improve their satisfaction with the Iraqi government. It could also make them less susceptible to recruitment by the enemy.

According to US Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, the enemy's center of gravity–his source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act–arises in part from his ability to generate and sustain popular support among the people in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations,* page vii, points out that engendering a sense of stability in the population is essential to combating the enemy:
"...Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations....

Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success."

CURRENT SITUATION

Iraqi, US, and coalition partner forces are limited in their abilities to apprehend terrorists and insurgents through offensive operations. Given those limitations, the enemy appears to have the ability to recruit, train, transport, and resupply at a rate that matches the coalition's ability to kill or capture them. Civil operations may offer a better and, given the limitations, easier opportunity to positively affect a greater number of Iraqis.

A drive through Baghdad or a walk through one of the city's neighborhoods makes it obvious that a great number of things could be done to employ Iraqi citizens and improve living conditions for all Iraqis. Initiatives should be financed by the Iraqi government, through investment by coalition partners or through private donations and enterprise; not by American taxpayers. Initially, the initiatives should be nationalized. Later, they could be privatized to allow for healthy competition.

A drive through Baghdad or a walk through one of the city's neighborhoods makes it obvious that a great number of things could be done to employ Iraqi citizens and improve living conditions for all Iraqis.

A large number of employed Iraqis work in security. In Baghdad 40,000 to 45,000 Sons of Iraq are paid $300 to $800 per month (depending upon rank) to provide security. Nationally, Sons of Iraq members number 50,000. The Iraqi Security Force (an umbrella organization made up of the National Police, Iraqi Police, Department of Border Enforcement, the Port of Entry Directorate, and a few other smaller organizations) also provide security employment. The Iraqi Army ultimately intends to have 12 divisions. Some are skeptical about how much security is actually gained from all of these forces and whether Iraqi society is improved by them.

If the Government of Iraqi shifted its focus to civic and economic improvement projects, its citizens would find more employment opportunities in a more stable environment and enjoy a higher quality of life. The following are a few examples of initiatives that, should funding be made available, would provide employment for Iraqi citizens. Some are already being implemented by US forces or their coalition partners, but could be expanded.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction of both public buildings and private homes could serve as a means of increasing goodwill between the sects as well as providing employment opportunities. More initiatives to rebuild places of worship should include Sunni and Shia mosques, places of worship in Kurdish areas, Christian churches, and multi-denominational places of worship. Places of worship have frequently been destroyed by opposing sects. If the Iraqi government, which is primarily Shia, was to help rebuild the places of worship of traditionally adversarial sects, a message of religious tolerance would be clear. In addition to showing itself capable of providing employment for skilled and unskilled laborers as well as architects, engineers, and other professionals, the government would be seen as supporting all Iraqis. Rebuilding homes across sects would have a similar impact and further legitimize the government.

WASTE MANAGEMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION

Iraqis would benefit from aggressive waste management programs. Programs might include creating a viable garbage collection system with recycling and salvage centers or dispatching teams of cleaners in Baghdad and other parts

of Iraq. A single-stream waste system in which recyclables and other refuse are sorted from a central location would create "sorting" jobs for the uneducated and unskilled members of Iraqi society. Landscaping programs would also provide thousands of jobs for Iraqis and private enterprise in this area would seem to be quite plausible.

UTILITIES

Anyone looking at the massive entanglement of electrical wires on many Iraqi streets would see that the situation is unacceptable and hazardous. Responsibility for part of the unreliable electrical service in Iraq lies not with the source but with the delivery network. Tearing down and replacing the network would employ thousands of Iraqis and gain the appreciation of the people. Given that Iraq is an oil-rich nation, it might seem ironic to suggest the country consider replacing existing energy sources with alternative energy sources, but Iraq does have ample supplies of sun and wind that could be tapped. The US Army has already encouraged the use of solar and wind energy on a small scale. Better water quality and availability would increase the level of satisfaction of Iraqi citizens. Here, too, is another opportunity to improve the quality of life and provide employment for Iraqi citizens.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION

Numerous Iraqis could be employed repairing roads, street-lights, guard rails, curbs, signage, traffic control medians, bridges, etc. Infrastructure improvement would provide plenty of employment opportunities for Iraqis with skill levels ranging from laborers to civil engineers and city planners. Many Iraqi citizens would benefit from an improved rail system by expanding it to reach parts of the country that are now without service. Improving the rail system would not only provide thousands of jobs, it would also send a clear message that Iraq intends to remain a unified nation. A vibrant rail network including cargo and passenger services could become something the entire nation could rally around. Expanded rail service would also improve trade between markets.

TRADE AND AQUACULTURE

Improving Iraqi markets would also benefit Iraqi citizens and small businesses. Many markets have very narrow walkways with uneven and broken surfaces. Expanding and improving the walkways would provide employment for Iraqis and allow for greater participation in marketplaces. Livestock sold or used for transportation in the markets, including goats, sheep, poultry and donkeys, would benefit from the services of veterinarians. Iraqis have an affinity for fish. Expanding or creating fisheries and other aquaculture in Iraq's lakes and rivers would create jobs and benefit the population.

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HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Improving health care in Iraq could employ thousands of people. In addition to providing work for trained health care workers, other Iraqis could be hired to improve existing hospitals, build new hospitals, or train future health care workers. Opportunities abound for improving or expanding existing schools and creating new schools, including trade schools. National education programs would provide Iraqi citizens with new opportunities to improve their status.

ART AND TOURISM

Iraqis once took great pride in their art and museums. Programs to benefit visual artists, writers, musicians, dancers, and other fine arts would provide jobs and resurrect this source of national pride. Enhancing tourism in some parts of Iraq and establishing it in others would provide jobs and encourage infrastructure improvements. Although at first glance this proposal might seem a stretch, tourism is returning to Iraq, as *Stars & Stripes* has noted. Additional travel destinations and resort areas could be established in historic or scenic areas as they are vacated by US forces. The palaces and lakes around Victory Base Complex, for instance, are near Baghdad International Airport and might attract tourists.

"We need a national project to save Iraq," said Bassim Sharif, a moderate legislator of the Fadhila Party.

CONCLUSION

Iraqi leaders have a number of opportunities to reduce unemployment, improve living conditions for all citizens, and end sectarianism. The United States and its coalition partners have already implemented some of these initiatives, but the Iraqi government needs to embrace and expand upon them. Some leaders already see the value.

"We need a national project to save Iraq," said Bassim Sharif, a moderate legislator of the Fadhila Party. A national undertaking that would employ citizens and improve quality of life holds the hope of stabilizing Iraq and moving the world closer to defeating common enemies.

Many American taxpayers are unwilling to take on additional debt in Iraq, but coalition partners, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, other nations, and the Iraqis themselves could have considerable impact by pursuing initiatives to lessen unemployment and improve Iraqi standards of living. Iraqi leaders should be pressed during "key leader personal engagements" to improve employment opportunities. They have numerous initiatives available to them. Initiatives that could create a national agenda and galvanize the population.



Members of the 1411th Civil Affairs Company and the Wasit Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) speak with Iraqi engineers during an inspection of an electrical sub-station project in Dabooni, Iraq, 28 October 2009. The project is one of the PRT's many ongoing civil engineering projects. (USA Photo by Staff Sgt Brien Vorhees)

The Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative is a civilian-military interagency effort that provides the primary connection between US and coalition partners and provincial and local governments in all of Iraq's 18 provinces.

The PRT focus is on five thematic areas including governance, economics, infrastructure, rule of law, and public diplomacy. The teams work to assist provincial and local governments with a range of engagement, training, jobs, and small grant programs.

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

AIR BRANCH – POC alsaa@langley.af.mil

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
AOMSW *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare* **Distribution Restricted**	17 NOV 08	NTTP 3-20.8 AFTTP 3-2.74	Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercises to maximize the effectiveness of "air attacks on enemy surface vessels". Status: **Current**
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations* **Distribution Restricted**	9 JUL 05	FM 3-06.1 MCRP 3-35.3A NTTP 3-01.04 AFTTP 3-2.29	Description: Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. Status: **Current – Revision on hold pending review of JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations**
IADS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System* **Distribution Restricted**	1 MAY 09	FM 3-01.15 MCRP 3-25E NTTP 3-01.8 AFTTP 3-2.31	Description: Provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: **Current**
JFIRE *Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower* **Distribution Restricted**	20 DEC 07	FM 3-09.32 MCRP 3-16.6A NTTP 3-09.2 AFTTP 3-2.6	Description: Pocket size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Status: **Current**
JSEAD / ARM-J *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment* **Classified SECRET**	28 MAY 04	FM 3-01.4 MCRP 3-22.2A NTTP 3-01.42 AFTTP 3-2.28	Description: Contributes to Service interoperability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single, consolidated reference. Status: **Assessment to retain**
JSTARS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System* **Distribution Restricted**	16 NOV 06	FM 3-55.6 MCRP 2-24A NTTP 3-55.13 AFTTP 3-2.2	Description: Provides procedures for the employment of JSTARS in dedicated support to the JFC. Describes multi-Service TTP for consideration and use during planning and employment of JSTARS. Status: **Assessment to retain**
KILL BOX *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment* **Distribution Restricted**	4 AUG 09	FM 3-09.34 MCRP 3-25H NTTP 3-09.2.1 AFTTP 3-2.59	Description: Assists the Services and JFCs in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Status: **Current**
SCAR *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance* **Distribution Restricted**	26 NOV 08	FM 3-60.2 MCRP 3-23C NTTP 3-03.4.3 AFTTP 3-2.72	Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) MTTP to the military Services for the conduct of air interdiction against targets of opportunity. Status: **Current**
SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY *Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery* **Distribution Restricted**	20 MAR 07	FM 3-50.3 NTTP 3-50.3 AFTTP 3-2.26	Description: Provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Status: **Current**
TAGS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System* **Distribution Restricted/ REL ABCA**	10 APR 07	FM 3-52.2 NTTP 3-56.2 AFTTP 3-2.17	Description: Promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC's campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground ops. Status: **Current**

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TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
TST *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets* **Distribution Restricted**	20 APR 04	FM 3-60.1 MCRP 3-16D NTTP 3-60.1 AFTTP 3-2.3	Description: Provides the JFC, the operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any AOR. Includes lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Status: **Revision**
UAS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems* **Distribution Restricted**	3 AUG 06	FM 3-04.15 NTTP 3-55.14 AFTTP 3-2.64	Description: Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and most importantly, multi-Service execution. Status: **Revision**

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TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
ADVISING *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces* **Distribution Restricted**	10 SEP 09	FM 3-07.10 MCRP 3-33.8A NTTP 3-07.5 AFTTP 3-2.76	Description: This publication serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. It is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces with viable TTP so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Status: **Current**
AIRFIELD OPENING *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening* **Distribution Restricted**	15 MAY 07	FM 3-17.2 NTTP 3-02.18 AFTTP 3-2.68	Description: A quick-reference guide to opening an airfield in accordance with MTTP. Contains planning considerations, airfield layout, and logistical requirements for opening an airfield. Status: **Current**
CORDON AND SEARCH *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations* **Distribution Restricted**	25 APR 06	FM 3-06.20 MCRP 3-31.4B NTTP 3-05.8 AFTTP 3-2.62	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in cordon and search operations. Provides MTTP for the planning and execution of cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war. Status: **Assessment**
EOD *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment* **Approved for Public Release**	27 OCT 05	FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTTP 3-02.5 AFTTP 3-2.32	Description: Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a joint EOD force. It assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service. Status: **Revision**
MILITARY DECEPTION *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception* **Classified SECRET**	12 APR 07	MCRP 3-40.4A NTTP 3-58.1 AFTTP 3-2.66	Description: Facilitate the integration, synchronization, planning, and execution of MILDEC operations. Servce as a "one stop" reference for service MILDEC planners to plan and execute multi-service MILDEC operations. Status: **Current**
NLW *Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons* **Approved for Public Release**	24 OCT 07	FM 3-22.40 MCWP 3-15.8 NTTP 3-07.3.2 AFTTP 3-2.45	Description: This publication provides a single-source, consolidated reference on the tactical employment of NLWs and offers commanders and their staff guidance for NLW employment and planning. Commanders and staffs can use this publication to aid in the tactical employment of NLW during exercises and contingencies. Status**: Current**
PEACE OPS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations* **Approved for Public Release**	20 OCT 03 Change 1 incorporated 14 APR 09	FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40	Description: Provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. Status: **Current with Change 1**
TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations* **Distribution Restricted**	13 JAN 09	FM 4-01.45 MCRP 4-11.3H NTTP 4-01.3 AFTTP 3-2.58	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in convoy operations into a single multi-Service TTP. Provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment. Status: **Current**

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TITLE	DATE	PUB 3	DESCRIPTION/STATUS
TECHINT *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations* **Approved for Public Release**	9 JUN 06	FM 2-22.401 NTTP 2-01.4 AFTTP 3-2.63	Description: Provides a common set of MTTP for technical intelligence operations. Serves as a reference for Service technical intelligence planners and operators. Status: **Assessment**
UXO *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations* **Approved for Public Release**	16 AUG 05	FM 3-100.38 MCRP 3-17.2B NTTP 3-02.4.1 AFTTP 3-2.12	Description: Describes hazards of UXO submunitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict. Status: **Revision**

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac2@langley.af.mil

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
AIRSPACE CONTROL *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control* **Distribution Restricted**	22 MAY 09	FM 3-52.1 AFTTP 3-2.78	Description: This MTTP publication is a tactical level document, which will synchronize and integrate airspace command and control functions and serve as a single source reference for planners and commanders at all levels Status: **Current**
BREVITY *Multi-Service Brevity Codes* **Distribution Restricted**	30 OCT 07	FM 1-02.1 MCRP 3-25B NTTP 6-02.1 AFTTP 3-2.5	Description: Defines multi-Service brevity which standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations. Status: **Worldwide Review**
CIVIL SUPPORT *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations* **Distribution Restricted**	3 DEC 07	FM 3-28.1 NTTP 3-57.2 AFTTP 3-2.67	Description: Fills the Civil Support Operations MTTP void and assists JTF commanders in organizing and employing Multi-Service Task Force support to civil authorities in response to domestic crisis. Status: **Current**
COMCAM *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations* **Approved for Public Release**	24 MAY 07	FM 3-55.12 MCRP 3-33.7A NTTP 3-13.12 AFTTP 3-2.41	Description: Fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. Status: **Current**
HAVE QUICK *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for HAVE QUICK Radios* **Distribution Restricted**	7 MAY 04	FM 6-02.771 MCRP 3-40.3F NTTP 6-02.7 AFTTP 3-2.49	Description: Simplifies planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures. Provides operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training. Status: **Assessment**
HF-ALE *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios* **Distribution Restricted**	20 NOV 07	FM 6-02.74 MCRP 3-40.3E NTTP 6-02.6 AFTTP 3-2.48	Description: Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enables joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications. Status: **Current**
JATC *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control* **Distribution Restricted**	23 JUL 09	FM 3-52.3 MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP 3-2.23	Description: Provides guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or AOR. Status: **Current**
JTF IM *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management* **Distribution Restricted**	10 SEP 03	FM 6-02.85 (FM 101-4) MCRP 3-40.2A NTTP 3-13.1.16 AFTTP 3-2.22	Description: Describes how to manage, control, and protect information in a JTF headquarters conducting continuous operations. Status: **Assessment**

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac2@langley.af.mil			
TITLE	**DATE**	**PUB #**	**DESCRIPTION/STATUS**
REPROGRAMMING *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems* **Distribution Restricted**	22 JAN 07	FM 3-13.10 (FM 3-51.1) NTTP 3-51.2 AFTTP 3-2.7	Description: Supports the JTF staff in planning, coordinating, and executing reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. Status: **Revision**
TACTICAL CHAT *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations* **Distribution Restricted**	7 JUL 09	FM 6-02.73 MCRP 3-40.2B NTTP 6-02.8 AFTTP 3-2.77	Description: This publication provides MTTP to standardize and describe the use of internet tactical chat (TC) in support of operations. It provides commanders and their units with guidelines to facilitate coordination and integration of TC when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations. Status: **Current**
TACTICAL RADIOS *Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment* **Approved for Public Release**	14 JUN 02	FM 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP 3-2.18	Description: Standardizes joint operational procedures for SINCGARS and provides an overview of the multi-Service applications of EPLRS. Status: **Assessment**
UHF TACSAT/DAMA *Multi- Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations* **Approved for Public Release**	31 AUG 04	FM 6-02.90 MCRP 3-40.3G NTTP 6-02.9 AFTTP 3-2.53	Description: Documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. (Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies.) Status: **Assessment**

NEW PROJECTS

TITLE	SERVICE	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
CFSOF I&I *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability* **Distribution Restricted**	USA USMC USN USAF USSOCOM	Description: This publication assists in planning and executing operations where conventional forces and special operations forces (CF/SOF) occupy the same operational environment. Status: **Signature Draft**
MDO *Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations* **Distribution Restricted**	USA USMC USN USAF	Description: This MTTP publication describes US Military dive mission areas (DMA) as well as the force structure, equipment, and primary missions that each Service could provide to a JTF Commander. Status**: Final Coordination Draft**

RECENTLY RESCINDED PUBLICATIONS

MTTP for Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Security Issues in a Joint Integrated Air Defense *System - 11 December 03. Rescinded 6 August 09.*

Joint Task Force Liaison Officer Integration (JTF-LNO) *– 27 January 03. Rescinded 29 September 09.*

Improved Data Modem Integration (IDM) *– 30 May 03. Rescinded 2 October 09.*

ALSA ORGANIZATION



Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare (AOMSW)
17 Nov 08

Aviation Urban Operations
9 Jul 05

Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
1 May 09

Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE)
20 Dec 07

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
16 Nov 06

Kill Box Employment
4 Aug 09

Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR)
26 Nov 08

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD)
28 May 04

Survival, Evasion, and Recovery
20 Mar 07

Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
3 Aug 06

Targeting Time Sensitive Targets (TST)
20 Apr 04

Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS)
10 Apr 07

Advising Foreign Forces
10 Sep 09

Airfield Opening
15 May 07

Conducting Peace Operations (PEACE OPS)
14 Apr 09 (CH1)

Cordon and Search Operations
25 Apr 06

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
27 Oct 05

Military Deception (MILDEC)
12 Apr 07

Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)
24 Oct 07

Tactical Convoy Operations (TCO)
13 Jan 09

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)
9 Jun 06

Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations (UXO)
16 Aug 05

Airspace Control
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Combat Camera Operations (COMCAM)
24 May 07

Have Quick Radios
7 May 04

High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment Radios (HF-ALE)
20 Nov 07

Joint Air Traffic Control (JATC)
23 Jul 09

Joint Task Force Information Management (JTF-IM)
10 Sep 03

Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing (Reprogramming)
22 Jan 07

Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations (Tactical Chat)
7 Jul 09

Tactical Radios
14 Jun 02

Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations (UHF TACSAT/DAMA)
31 Aug 04

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